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ABSTRACT
This article discusses a new concept of ‘traditional religions’ and other notions related to ‘tradition.’ How is public 
opinion being shaped, and how is decision-making and state policy towards the Russian Orthodox Church and Islam 
being influenced by these concepts? Since 1991, religions (in particular, the Russian Orthodox Church and Islam) 
have enjoyed a revival; and the Russian administration, under Yeltsin and especially under Putin, has taken a number 
of steps to incorporate religious establishments into the political framework of the state. We will examine these 
changes through the example of laws on religious liberty, and by analysing public discourse. On the one hand, the 
religious revival includes a number of so-called “non-traditional” religions that clearly fall under this policy. In the 
case of Islam, this is especially important with respect to changing Russian policies towards so-called “Wahhabism” 
and “religious extremism”. On the other hand, official discourse centered around “traditionality” is borrowed by 
the representatives of different denominations to a degree determined by public status. This phenomenon is worth 
studying as an incorporation of an official category into religious discourse.
Keywords: Russia, Orthodoxy, Islam, tradition, religious politics.
1. Introduction
Throughout the last 15 years, the concept of “traditional religions” has become ever 
more widely used. One can find it in official documents, spokesmen’s speeches and religious 
leaders’ statements. At the same time, the exact definition of “traditional religions” still poses 
problems for researchers of religious studies. Moreover, this new category is of concern 
to human rights advocates, since it is difficult to apply it to the Russian legislative system. 
Hence, it is of interest to observe the origins of this notion, how it is used in religious and 
secular discourse and what processes it evidences. 
2. “Traditional religions” in legislation and public discourse
The four confessions which later received the label “traditional” were first fixed in the 
federal law “On freedom of conscience and religious associations” adopted in 1997. The 
law’s preamble contains two clauses which change the spirit of the predecessor law “On 
religious freedom” adopted in 1990:
The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation:
…acknowledging the special role of Orthodox Christianity in the history of Russia, and in the 
establishment and development of its spirituality and culture,
…respecting Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism and other religions, that comprise the 
inalienable part of the heritage of the Russian people,
…adopts the present law. (О свободе совести…, 1997)
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Here we can see that Russian Orthodoxy has been given a special status among other 
confessions, while Christianity (in general, without specification), Islam, Buddhism and 
Judaism are also singled out. In addition, there is reference to something called “other 
religions,” but the sense of this phrase is never specified – neither in the preamble, nor in the 
text of the law. 
In spite of the fact that the noted religions are cited in the federal law, their status remains 
unclear. On the one hand, the law’s preamble does not have legal significance and cannot be 
used in court. On the other hand, the term “traditional religions” is not used in the law or 
in the preamble. It is worth adding that the difference between and among religions is not 
mentioned in the text of the law. 
The contradictions mentioned appear to be the result of the confrontation of dramatically 
different points of view within the law development commission. According to Mikhail 
Odintsov, head of the Department for the Defence of Religious Freedom and Human Rights 
Ombudsman of the Russian Federation, the last law represents a sort of touchstone in the 
field of religious freedom.
On the one hand, the law takes into consideration the principle of secularism and the 
general statements about religious freedom as defined in the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation. Cf.:  
1. The Russian Federation is a secular state. No religion shall be established as state or 
obligatory.
2. Religious associations shall be separated from the state and shall be equal before the law. 
(Конституция…, 1993: Статья 14)
Everyone shall be guaranteed the freedom of conscience, the freedom of religion, including 
the right to profess individually or together with others any religion or to profess no religion at 
all, to freely choose, possess and disseminate religious and other views and act according to them. 
(Конституция, 1993: Статья 28)
Hence, the Constitution takes into account the opinions of that part of Russian society 
which is interested in the defence of the principle of secularism in its most pronounced 
form. This type of secularism is close to the French conception of laïcité and especially 
to the American model, which inspired the authors of the first Constitution of the Russian 
Federation.
At the same time, the law’s preamble, as well as the clause referring to religious associations 
that have existed on the territory of the Russian Federation for more than 15 years, reflect 
the concerns of another part of Russian society that is anxious about the active dissemination 
of new religious movements in the first half of the 1990s in the country. Alongside this 
process, one can observe the growing influence of the Russian Orthodox Church during the 
first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union. These processes definitely played their 
role in the development of the law. According to lawyer Anatolii Pchelintsev, a member of 
the working group on the law of 1997, the preamble was added after the personal intervention 
of Patriarch Alexii II. The text of the letter of the Council of Bishops of the Orthodox Church, 
written in February 1997 to State Duma Chairman Gennadii Seleznev, is typical:
Particularly pitiful is that the present federal law “On The Freedom of Religion” and the draft 
amendments to the law fail to acknowledge the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church over the 
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course of a millenium has shaped the historic, spiritual and moral face of the Russian people and 
that the overwhelming majority of believers belong to this organisation (Одинцов, 1997: 172).
Meanwhile, from around the end of the 1990s, the concept of “traditional religions,” 
which is not legally defined, but was inspired by the preamble of the law of 1997, came 
into common use. First of all, it has been used in Russian political discourse about religion. 
However, the content of this concept has not been specified in any official document. For 
example, on 12 February 2012, the then-Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Vladimir 
Putin held a meeting “with Patriarch Kirill and leaders of traditional religious communities in 
Russia.” In addition to the representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church, the meeting was 
attended by representatives of the Council of Muftis, the Muslim Coordination Centre for 
the North Caucasus, the Buddhist Traditional Sangha, the Armenian Apostolic Church, the 
Russian Old Believers Church, the Catholic Bishops Conference, the Federation of Jewish 
Communities of Russia, the Russian Association of Islamic Consent, the Spiritual Board 
of Muslims, the Russian Union of Evangelical Faith Christians and the Church of Seventh 
Day Adventists. But it remains unclear whether this list of religious organisations, whose 
representatives participated in the meeting, is equivalent to the list of “traditional religions” 
referred to by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin (Стенограмма встречи, 2012).
A separate path of development for the new concept is the school course “Basics of 
religious cultures and secular ethics”, introduced into the school curriculum in 2012. 
The course consists of six modules of the student’s choice. Four of them are dedicated to 
“traditional” religions, the other two concern so-called “secular ethics” and “history of 
religions”. The choice of modules differs markedly by region, but on average in March 2010, 
60% of students chose “secular ethics” or “history of religions”. However, while the class 
is divided into groups depending on the students’ choices and on their religious affiliations, 
it is difficult to assume the achievement of the stated objectives of the course – namely, 
the development of tolerance. In addition, the first and the last lessons of each module are 
dedicated to the theme of patriotism (named, for instance, “Russia is our Homeland”), 
indicating the use of the course on religion as an ideological tool (Kovalskaya, 2013: 45-59).
 
3. Borrowing of the term by religious organisations
3.1. The traditsionnost as a core component of legitimacy
In the end, the concept of “traditional religions” was adopted also by the representatives of 
religions. We should mention that there is an obvious difference in the use of this expression, 
depending on the status of the religious organisation.
Thus, members of the dominant religions, such as Christianity or Islam, freely operate with 
this concept, referring to the preamble to the Law on Freedom of Conscience. Moreover, since 
the dominant position of the Russian Orthodox Church is not in question, the representatives 
of the Orthodox Church do not focus on the inclusion of Orthodoxy among the traditional 
religions of Russia, because there is no particular need for this. The word “traditional” is 
increasingly used by the representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church in relation to other 
areas, particularly in reference to the concept of “traditional values” (Патриарх Кирилл, 
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2011). We should add here that the notions of traditsionnye tsennosti ‘traditional values’ and 
istinnye tsennosti ‘true values’ employed by representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church 
and many public figures are worth studying as well. This creates a kind of semantic field, at 
the centre of which is the concept of “tradition”. This attention to traditions is similar to the 
activity of some members of the “United Russia “ and “Fair Russia” political parties, which 
insist in particular on the preservation of “traditional family values “ (Мизулина, 2013). The 
church is, therefore, one of the channels of state ideology of the last 10-15 years, which has 
a moderately conservative character.
The image of a “traditional” religion is forged in Russian Orthodox Church discourse 
by the use of indirect methods, with no explicit reference to a “traditional religion.” For 
example, an important place in the texts and statements of representatives of the Orthodox 
Church is taken by the concept of Rus and the symbols associated with the state of Kievan 
Rus (Обращение дискуссионного клуба Всемирного русского народного собора…, 
2013). At the same time, the Orthodox Church focuses on its relationship to a certain 
ethnic group – the “Russian people” (russkii narod) – which is the bearer of tradition, as 
well as of “Russian civilization” (rossiiskaia tsivilizatsiia). In particular, on the website the 
World Russian People’s Council headed by Patriarch Kirill, it is stated that “Russia was 
the only civilization in the world to stand up to western colonial expansion” (Обращение 
дискусионного клуба…, 2013). Note that the name of the organisation has no ties with the 
Orthodox Church and focuses on the ethnic component, which, in the Russian Orthodox 
Church’s judgment, is inextricably linked to the religious one. 
Denominations that do not have such a large congregation, in contrast, insist on the fact 
that they are “traditional religions” or at least use references to something “traditional.” To 
demonstrate this phenomenon, it is worth analysing the presentations of various religious 
organisations at a conference on church-state relations and expertise in religion, held in 2006 
in St. Petersburg, with the support of the State Museum of History of Religion. Director 
of the Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church Pastor Alexander mentioned that since 
(Мусиенко, Кучинский, 2006: 40-41):
 ... [the] window to Europe was opened with the active assistance of ... our Lutheran ancestors, 
… the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Russia rightly calls itself a traditional denomination. 
The priest of the Armenian Apostolic Church Sarkis (A.R. Chopuryan) describes in detail 
the history of the relationship between the Russian state and the Armenian communities 
starting from the XVIII century, and argues that “the State ... declares the priority of 
traditional religions, maintains relationships with traditional religions” (Мусиенко, 
Кучинский, 2006: 47-49). Mufti Ponchaev worried about the activities of “sectarian and 
missionary organisations” and proposed that officials “discuss the status of traditional 
religions” (Мусиенко, Кучинский, 2006: 63). Thus, the concept of “traditional religions” is 
an essential element when it comes to legitimising a particular religion. At the same time, a 
key role in the definition of traditionality is played by the time factor, emphasising the long 
history of relations – a principle that is widely used in branding strategies.
In contrast, denominations which do not have sufficient weight to refer to any “tradition” 
usually insist on the principle of equality of religions before the law. Thus, the Social Doctrine 
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of the Church of the Seventh-day Adventist says (Основы социального учения…, 2013):
…the earthly authortities have no right to adopt laws… that give priority to any religious 
confession. Thus, no conference shall seek to adopt legislation that provides it with indubitable 
priority over others.
It should be noted that the discourse of the Russian Orthodox Church in the early 1990s 
was also quite democratic. The Appeal of the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox 
Church of April 4, 1992 states, “We firmly stand for the right of every individual to religious 
self-determination and for the equality of all religions before the law and do not seek to limit 
anyone’s religious choices” [Архиерейский Собор 1992]. This position of the Orthodox 
Church in 1992 is markedly different from the current one, which is explained in the Basic 
Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church: “The Russian Orthodox Church has 
the right to expect that the government will take into account the number of followers of 
religious associations and religious organisations when building relations, as well as their 
role in shaping the historical, cultural and spiritual aspect of the nation and their civic stand” 
(Основы социальной концепции…, 2000). Thus, we can assume that the democracy level 
of denomination discourse is inversely proportional to its political weight.
3.2. Traditional Islam and religious extremism
As for Islam, the notion of traditionality is applied to it in a special way. This is because 
in the Russian context it concerns only certain Muslim movements, and not Islam in general. 
That is why the term “traditional Islam” is often heard, as are disputes about its definition. 
For example, in the Volga Region traditional Islam is treated as the “Hanafi mazhab of the 
Sunni Islam”.
At the same time, it should be noted that the concept of “right” or “good” Islam, which 
is now called “traditional” Islam, changed appreciably during the XX century. Thus, in 
the first years after the Revolution of 1917, the Soviet government promoted the reformist 
Islamic movements of fundamentalist type, whose leaders called for a return to “pure” Islam, 
“according to the Koran,” and to reject local rites in favour of the “international” Islam 
that was in tune with the communist ideology of the time. In doctrinal terms, these currents 
are very close to the modern adherents of Salafism in Islam. However, their teachings do 
not find any support in contemporary Muftiates, nor among representatives of the state. 
In the first decade after the October Revolution, meanwhile, it was possible to see Jadid 
movement activities in the cities. Jadid represented Tatar Muslim intellectuals, who called 
for the modernisation of Islam – which would require giving up some of its canons that were 
problematic in the “progressive society” (Исхаков, 2013). After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the concept of “Euro-Islam” developed by the director of the Institute of History of 
Tatarstan Rafael Khakimov has spread in secular circles, with the support of the President 
of the Republic of Tatarstan. Tolerant and open to modernity, this conception developed the 
ideas of Tatar Jadids to almost full exemption from compliance with any rituals (Хакимов, 
2003). Nevertheless, it should be noted that this concept has received a lot of criticism from 
the Tatar clergy. In contrast, the last mufti of Tatarstan Camille Samigullin elected in March 
74
Mundo Eslavo, 12 (2013), 69-78
Kristina KovalsKaya - The traditional and the non-traditional in the religious life of the Russian Federation
2013 advocates kadimist traditions, a conservative trend in Tatar Islam, usually opposed to 
Jadids. Thus, the current “traditional Islam” is located to the “right “ of Islam, and its main 
criterion is loyalty to the secular administration.
We can observe a similar situation in the Caucasus, where the Naqshbandi Sufi tariqa 
has been promoted as “traditional Islam” for the past few years. However, as noted by the 
historian Shamil Shikhaliev, Sufism was not perceived at all as being “traditional” in the 
period of the Russian Empire, but rather as a dangerous movement (Шихалиев, 2013). In 
contrast, Jadids had the support of the pre-revolutionary government. In the 1920s, the Soviet 
leadership involved Jadids and Sufis in the achievement of its aims, particularly in the reform 
of the educational system. From 1928, Sufis who protested against collectivisation were 
repressed. In the late 1930s, when a sufficient number of Soviet personnel had been formed, 
Jadids were also subjected to repression, in spite of the fact that they supported the Soviet 
policy in the field of education. Since World War II, there has been a partial legalisation of 
Islam in the Caucasus, but Sufi practices were still unwelcome. Since the post-Soviet period, 
Sufism – or rather, its mahmudiyya branch, to which Said Afandi Chirkeisk belonged – has 
been treated as a “traditional” movement.
In contrast, those forms of Islam that differ from the “official” kind are called “non-
traditional.” They encounter great difficulties in dealing with the authorities because 
the expression “non-traditional Islam” has entered the same semantic field as “religious 
extremism” and “terrorism.” This is particularly true of those trends in Islam that are 
“imported” and are automatically considered as hostile. At the same time, all these trends, 
despite their significant doctrinal differences, are often grouped under the common term 
“Wahhabism,” which is used in the media as a synonym for “religious extremism” and 
“terrorism.” Incidentally, it is curious to observe the increasing role of a new sociological 
group of experts in shaping the image of “non-traditional” Islam as the enemy of public 
safety. For instance, Roman Silant’ev, who often appears in the media as an expert on Islam, 
writes in his encyclopedia “Islam in Contemporary Russia” (Силантьев, 2008: 129):
In Russia, the Wahhabis are normally undestood as followers of Salafism, i.e. “Saf” or Clear 
Islam, Hanbalism, Habashism, Tablihism, Nursism, “Islamic Jamaaats,” so-called non-Mazhab 
Sunnism, military Shiism, as well as the Hizb-ut-Tahrir party and its large number of clones. 
As the text above shows, the term “Wahhabi” is applied to completely different trends 
that are united only by the fact that they are hostile to the Russian state according to the 
expert’s opinion. No less vague a definition of “Wahhabism” is given in “The Basis of the 
Social Concept of the Russian Muslims”:
The Russian Council of Muftis condemns all forms of terrrorism and extremism, including 
those of so-called Wahhabism, that contain the following principles:
1) Denial of Islam’s founding traditions, i.e. denial of four historically-developed Mazhabs 
or Shiism.
2) Teachings that proclaim exceptionism and the right to declare traditional believers who 
disagree with their interpretation of Sharia law “non-Muslims” (including the followers of one of 
the four traditional Mazhabs or Shiism). 
3) Entrusting oneself with a right to voluntarily infringe on rights or kill beyond the scope 
of necessary self-defence of Kafisrs, including traditional Muslims, who have not joined the 
respective organisation (Основные положения социальной программы…, 2001).
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As we can see, “Wahhabis” are defined as movements that deny mazhabs’ claim to be 
exceptional and “infringe on other people’s rights”. Another important feature of “non-
traditional Islam” is the dissemination of “foreign influence.” To fight against this, the 
muftiates try to unify Muslim education. For example, the Spiritual Board of Muslims of 
Tatarstan is developing common programmes for Tatarstan madrassas. This is evidenced by 
a characteristic statement by the head of the Volga Centre of Regional and Ethno-religious 
Studies of the Russian Institute of Strategic Initiatives (RISI) Rais Suleimanov, who regularly 
appears in the media as an expert on Islam (Мусульманское образование в Татарстане…, 
2013): “Tatarstan needs that in order to get rid of the non-traditional movements. It would be 
much safer if we have one approved (school) manual”. 
Non-traditional Islam, therefore, is equivalent to extremism. The same idea, but 
from within the Muslim community, is formulated by Deputy Mufti Rustam Batrov 
(Мусульманское образование в Татарстане…, 2013):
Our call is for orientation towards traditional Islam, and its deep theological comprehension. 
Extremist movements appear because they are unfamiliar with the age-old theological tradition. 
And now, among other measures, we plan to teach religion-related subjects using not just any 
old books, but rather classical manuals. Now, as always, the Tatar madrassahs are not preparing 
extremists – and we plan to tighten our control over this even more. 
As a result, the concept of “traditionality” in Islam directly applies to those movements 
that show their loyalty to the existing government and a willingness to be unified under state 
control, and that appear in the broadcasting media to be in accord with state ideology. These 
currents are fixed in the collective memory, in particular through museum exhibitions. For 
example, the deputy director of the Museum of the History of Religion in St. Petersburg, 
Catherine Teriukova, notes that the museum works only with one branch of Islam – namely, 
the “Tatar Muslims.”
 
4. “Traditional Religions”: why and for what?
Diffusion of the concept of “traditional religions” is part of a larger process – designing 
“tradition” as a core value of modern Russian ideology. In this case, the content of this 
“tradition,” or these “traditions,” is provided by the given ideal of patriotism, loyalty to the 
state and demographically effective model of family. “Traditional” religions are engaged by 
the state as one of channels to broadcast pertinent information. This idea can be illustrated 
by a statement of the priest Sarkis, which explicitly articulates the function of the church 
(Мусиенко, Кучинский, 2006: 51): “The Church does not only save souls, but also helps the 
state to fill the ranks of fully-fledged members of society.” 
That is why one can hardly talk about the “clericalism” of Russian society, as is often 
done in the publications of liberal historians and human-rights activists. For instance, the 
political scientist Kathy Rousselet (2013: 17) points out that, in the post-Soviet practices 
of the Russian Orthodox Church, the ritual part predominates over the doctrinal. As for 
the presence of the church in administrative, educational and social spheres, this is most 
often accompanied by the transfer of information on certain topics and does not necessarily 
indicate an increase in the influence of the church itself. On the contrary, Rousselet proposes 
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the hypothesis of a continuity between the communist ideology and the discourse of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, which both occupy a niche in an officially recognised system of 
values. The same function is performed by “traditional Islam,” which plays the role of an 
alternative to “religious extremism” and aims to unify current trends in Islam and facilitate 
state control over religious practice.
At the same time, the rejection of new religious movements and intolerance towards 
religious diversity demonstrate a commitment to the unification of religious life in general, 
the search for a unified religious form. As noted by Marlene Laruelle (2008: 280): 
This tradition of thinking about the relationship between the individual and the group 
provokes in part the widespread feeling that division (political, ideological, cultural) endangers 
the community, breaks the national unity instead of solidifying it ... the social contract currently in 
force in Russia is not built on the idea that the confrontation of opinions and interests is natural, 
but on the effort that everyone makes in favour of a consensus that validates the unity of the nation.
5. Conclusion
 
Thus, the diffusion of a new category of “traditional religions” can be explained, on the 
one hand, by the efforts of the state towards the unification and uniformisation of religious 
life in order to simplify control over religious organisations. It is partly due to an attempt 
to solve the problem of religious extremism. Another reason is the use of administrative 
and social resources of various denominations that have a long history of relations with the 
secular authorities. This approach turns out to be legitimate in the eyes of that part of Russian 
society that perceives the conflict of interests of different social groups as a split in society, 
but also because of the search for social forms of consolidating society. Apparently, this is 
also the reason for the replacement of ethnic identity with a confessional one, as per the 
“Orthodox because Russian” pattern. On the other hand, religious groups that have the right 
to be called “traditional” take it as a privilege that provides more rights and opportunities, so 
that they actively borrow the official lexicon.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the Sciences des Religions et Société department for their financial 
help during my fieldwork and Stéphane A. Dudoignon for his recommendations. The 
interviews quoted in the article were held in October-November 2012 and March 2013 in 
Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kazan. I am grateful to all my interviewees for having found 
time for me.
REFERENCES
Kovalskaya, K.V. (2013). Sainte Connaissance? Le discours d’experts du fait religieux et 
leur impact sur les identités et les pratiques religieuses en Fédération de Russie depuis 
1991. Mémoire de Master 2. Paris: Ėcole des Hautes Ėtudes en Sciences Sociales.
77
Mundo Eslavo, 12 (2013), 69-78
ESTUDIOS 
Laruelle, M. (2008). Politiques et idéologies des nationalismes dans l’espace russe et 
postsovietique. Mémoire d’habilitation à diriger des recherches. Paris: Institut d’études 
politiques de Paris. 
Rousselet, K. (2013). Sécularisation et orthodoxie dans la Russie contemporaine: pour une 
hypothèse continuiste? Paris: Centre d’études et de recherches internationales Sciences 
Po.
Исхаков, Д. (2013). Концепт “традиционного ислама”. Сайт Голос ислама. Просмотрено 
15 сентября 2013 на http://golosislama.ru/news.php?id=15507 
Мизулина, Е.Б. (18 мая 2013). Выступление на форуме «Россия многодетная: семья 
как одна из основ российской государственности». Сайт Справедливо Онлайн. 
Просмотрено 15 сентября 2013 на http://spravedlivo-online.ru/new/index.php/
news/956-Politika/15890-elena-mizulina-traditsionnye-semejnye-tsennosti-klyuch-k-
resheniyu-mnogikh-sotsialnykh-problem 
Мусиенко, Л.А., Кучинский, С.А. (сост.) (2006). Совершенствование государственно-
конфессиональных отношений и религиоведческая экспертиза. Вопросы 
взаимодействия органов государственной власти и религиозных объединений 
в Санкт-Петербурге и субъектах РФ. Материалы I Межрегиональной научно-
практической конференции. Санкт-Петербург: Государственный музей истории 
религии. 
Мусульманское образование в Татарстане перестроят по светским стандартам (26 
августа 2013). Информационное агентство РБК. Просмотрено 15 сентября 2013 
на http://rt.rbc.ru/tatarstan_topnews/26/08/2013/871582.shtml
О свободе совести и религиозных организациях, Федеральный закон 125-ФЗ (1997). 
Сайт Консультант. Просмотрено 11 сентября 2013 на http://base.consultant.ru/
cons/cgi/online.
Обращение дискуссионного клуба Всемирного Русского Народного Собора к 
мыслящим людям России: Верим в себя, в свой народ, в свою цивилизацию (2013). 
Сайт Вселенского Русского Собора. Просмотрено 24 апреля 2013 на http://www.
vrns.ru/news/1472/#.UjH-qH-d_Fw 
Одинцов, М.И. (1997). Россия строит светское государство (1985-1997). Государство, 
религия и церковь в России и за рубежом, 3-4, 34-172. 
Основные положения социальной программы российских мусульман. (2001). 
Официальный сайт Совета муфтиев России. Просмотрено 15 сентября 2013 на 
http://www.muslim.ru/articles/109/1087/ 
Основы социального учения Церкви Христиан Адвентистов Седьмого Дня (дата 
неизвестна). Сайт Церкви Христиан Адвентистов Седьмого Дня. Просмотрено 
15 сентября 2013 на http://www.asdarh.ru/social_doctrine#15 
Основы Социальной концепции Русской Православной Церкви (2000). Сайт 
Московского Патриархата Русской Православной Церкви. Просмотрено 13 
сентября 2013 на http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/141422 
Патриарх Кирилл (21 июня 2011). Права человека и традиционные ценности в Европе. 
Выступление Святейшего Патриарха Кирилла на заседании Европейского совета 
религиозных лидеров. Сайт Московского Патриархата Русской Православной 
Церкви. Просмотрено 15 сентября 2013 на http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1546416.
html 
Силантьев, Р.А. (2008). Энциклопедия «Ислам в современной России». Москва: 
Алгоритм.
Стенограмма встречи председателя Правительства РФ В.В. Путина со Святейшим 
Патриархом Кириллом и лидерами традиционных религиозных общин России (8 
декабря 2012). Сайт Московского Патриархата Русской Православной Церкви. 
Просмотрено 11 сентября 2013 на http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/2005767.html 
Хакимов, Р. (2003). Где наша Мекка? Манифест евроислама. Казань: Магариф. 
Шихалиев, Ш.Ш. (15 апреля 2013). Мусульманские элиты и власть в Дагестане, с 
конца царской эпохи до сталинского террора. Доклад, прочитанный на семинаре 
«Histoire et anthropologie des islams du Nord (Russie d’Europe et Sibérie, Caucase, 
Asie Centrale, Chine)» [История и антропология ислама на севере] в Высшей Школе 
Общественных Наук. Париж.
